'THE jealous and intolerant eye of the Kremlin can distinguish, in the end, only vassals and enemies; and the neighbours of Russia, if they do not wish to be one, must reconcile themselves to being the other". So wrote George Kennan, a senior America
n diplomat, in 1944.
The Georgians would be the first to confirm that not very much has changed in the past 60 years. They have had no intention of becoming a vassal; they are now an enemy.
In the last week we have seen Vladimir Putin's determination to exert dominance over Russia's 'near abroad'. In doing so Moscow has acted in a hypocritical manner. It is not that long ago since Russia suppressed, in the most brutal manner, separatist feeling in Chechnya. They did so claiming that they needed to preserve Russia's territorial integrity. Now they are attempting to destroy Georgia's by supporting secession in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Moreover, even if one acknowledges the ham-fisted way in which Georgia attempted to reclaim control of its breakaway provinces, it is clear that Russia's use of force was well planned. The troop movements it initiated were complex, and the swiftness with which it made grossly exaggerated claims of 'genocide' was breathtaking. This demonstrates a degree of premeditation that undermines any claim that Russia was forced to act on the grounds of humanitarian expediency.
President Mikheil Saakashvili, below, of Georgia has protested that the Russians would not have dared to attack his country if Nato, at its summit in Bucharest in April, had been willing to accept Georgia as a member. But the Russians are not naïve nor simple. What would Nato be doing that it is not doing, if Georgia was a member?
It is inconceivable that American, British and French troops would today be flying into Tbilisi to begin a war against the Russians and force the South Ossetians, against their will, back into Georgia. The First World War began with the murder of an Archduke in Sarajevo. The Third World War will not begin in South Ossetia.
But for the Russians the real target is not Georgia. It is Ukraine and, in particular, Crimea. Ukraine, which is a major European country, was ruled by Moscow for hundreds of years. The Kremlin cannot bear to see it as an independent, democratic state drawing closer to the West. It finds it intolerable that the Crimea, with a Russian-speaking population and the Russian Navy's largest base at Sevastopol, should not be part of Russia.
The United States and Western Europe must be tough with Russia over Georgia not just because of the aggression there but, even more importantly, because the Russians must not be tempted to try and dismember Ukraine. If that happened the whole balance of power in Europe since the end of the Cold War would be fragmented with highly-dangerous consequences.
The tense status quo is unlikely to evolve into a new Cold War. Russia does not have the military or economic strength to play the role of world superpower once more.
However, by attacking Georgia the Kremlin has ruined its chances of securing entry into the World Trade Organisation, and placed Russian membership of the G8 group of industrialised countries in deep jeopardy.
Russia's power is much weaker than it likes to believe.
Its oil and gas reserves are massive but if it refused to sell its gas to Europe it would be unable to sell it elsewhere because the pipelines do not exist. It would lose more than half of its own revenues and be in economic crisis.
The US and the EU must be both tough and realistic. They must not make threats they cannot enforce. Nato membership is largely irrelevant as there is no question of the US going to war with Russia over Georgia or Ukraine. But Russia can be punished, economically, politically and diplomatically for its aggressive behaviour.
It won't be a new Cold War. But there will be climate change. And it will get very chilly for some time to come.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP was foreign secretary and secretary of state for defence between 1992-97
The full article contains 709 words and appears in Scotland On Sunday newspaper.
